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Abstract What is the impact of firm entry regulation
on sustained entry into self-employment? How does
firm entry regulation influence the performance of
long-living entrants? In this paper, I address these
questions, exploiting a natural experiment in firm
entry regulation. After German reunification, East and
West Germany faced different economic conditions,
but fell under the same law that imposes a substantial
mandatory standard on entrepreneurs who want to
start a legally independent firm in one of the regulated
occupations. The empirical results suggest that the
entry regulation suppresses long-living entrants, not
only entrants in general or transient, short-lived
entrants. This effect on the number of long-living
entrants is not accompanied by a counteracting effect
on the performance of long-living entrants, as mea-
sured by firm size several years after entry.
Keywords Firm entry regulation  Sustained entry 
Self-employment  Firm size
JEL Classifications K20  L25  L26  L50  M13 
P52
1 Introduction
In recent decades, the regulation of firm entry and
entry into self-employment was changed in many
countries and industries worldwide. The World
Bank’s ‘‘Doing Business’’ reports, for example,
document 579 regulatory reforms between June
2007 and May 2009 (World Bank 2008, 2009). The
majority of these reforms were aimed at increasing
entry and competition in order to foster technological
progress, economic growth, and social welfare. While
many empirical studies based on micro data show
that reducing entry regulation increases entry, more
empirical evidence clarifying the specific mecha-
nisms linking entry regulation to technological pro-
gress, growth, and welfare is needed.
In this paper, I take one step in that direction by
investigating the impact of firm entry regulation on
one specific type of entry. The effects of entry
regulation on sustained entry into self-employment
are investigated, as well as the effects on the
performance of long-living entrants that are able to
sustain market activity for several years after entry.
The empirical analysis is for Germany in the decade
after reunification, a country with a strict regulatory
setting and a time period when a natural experiment
allows for identifying the effects of interest.
Various forms of geographical entry restrictions
are relevant to specific product markets in Germany.
According to Djankov et al. (2002), entrepreneurs
in Germany have to complete numerous time-
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consuming and costly administrative procedures. The
entry regulation under investigation in this paper
follows from the German Trade and Crafts Code
(Gesetz zur Ordnung des Handwerks). A substantial
mandatory standard, the master craftsman certificate
(Meistertitel), is imposed on entrepreneurs who want
to start a legally independent firm in one of the
regulated occupations. Similar standards exist in
other European countries, for example, in Austria,
The Netherlands, and Sweden, but the related firm
entry regulation in Germany is particularly strict
(Monopolkommission 1998).
To identify the effects of interest, I exploit the
situation after German reunification, when East and
West Germany faced very different economic con-
ditions, but fell under the same law regulating entry
in some occupations, but not in others. In the East
German transition economy new entrepreneurial
activities were suddenly needed to an unexpectedly
high degree. In addition, the East German pool of
individuals fulfilling the mandatory entry standard
for regulated occupations depended on decisions
taken under the planned economy system of the
German Democratic Republic (GDR). Accordingly,
the entry regulation in the German Trade and Crafts
Code should exert stronger effects on entry in the
East German transition economy than in the more
stable West German market economy. Building on
this conjecture, I estimate average effects of the
West–East shift in the regulatory context by com-
paring the difference between the average outcomes
in regulated occupations and unregulated occupa-
tions in East Germany after reunification against the
corresponding difference in West Germany.
The subsequent empirical analysis builds on
empirical studies that indicate less entry due to firm
entry regulation when using a general, broad mea-
sure of firm entry, or entry into self-employment, as
outcome variable. Bruhn (2008), Kaplan et al.
(2009), and Mullainathan and Schnabl (2010), for
example, present such evidence based on recent
micro data for Mexico and Peru. Prantl and Spitz-
Oener (2009) show that the entry regulation in the
German Trade and Crafts Code lowers a general
measure of entry into self-employment more in
regulated occupations in the East German transition
context after reunification than in the more stable
West German context. Empirical evidence for dif-
ferent sets of countries and different time periods is
provided by Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007),
Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004), as well as
Klapper et al. (2006). Their empirical findings are
in line with the view that the effects of country-level
entry regulation on entry, again broadly defined, are
more negative in industries with naturally high
entry or high employment growth than in other
industries.1
With its focus on sustained entry and the perfor-
mance of long-living entrants, this paper comple-
ments the existing literature on the effects of firm
entry regulation. To the best of my knowledge, no
other paper identifying regulatory effects from
within-country variation in micro data has the same
focus.2 More common are studies addressing the
effects of entry regulation on aggregate employment
creation, or productivity growth, in industries or
regions (Bertrand and Kramarz 2002; Chari 2009;
Sadun 2008; Viviano 2008). Further related work is
on the consequences of product market deregulation,
or banking deregulation, for industry dynamics
(Aghion et al. 2009; Bertrand et al. 2007; Cetorelli
and Strahan 2006; Kerr and Nanda 2009).
From the methodological point of view, the
empirical analysis presented here is most closely
related to Prantl and Spitz-Oener (2009), who
implement the same empirical approach. Using a
natural experiment in entry regulation and allowing
for two types of additive unobserved effects, the
approach is similar to standard difference-in-differ-
ence setups that exploit data variation across time and
regions or industries following from reforms of entry
1 Djankov (2009) and Schiantarelli (2008) survey further
related studies.
2 Even empirical analyses that have a similar focus and rely
entirely on data variation across countries are rare; one
exception is Capelleras et al. (2007). To date, several distinc-
tions between different types of entry or entrants have been
used in empirical analyses of regulatory effects on entrepre-
neurship, but no performance-related distinction between
sustained and transient entry as considered here. Bruhn
(2008), Capelleras et al. (2008), and Kaplan et al. (2009), for
example, distinguish between registered and unregistered
entrants; Ardagna and Lusardi (2010) compare regulatory
effects on entrepreneurs who want to pursue a business




regulation (Bruhn 2008; Kaplan, Piedra and Seira
2009). Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007), Fisman and
Sarria-Allende (2004), and Klapper et al. (2006),
instead provide empirical estimates identified from
data variation across countries and industries along
the lines of Rajan and Zingales (1998).
The main results in this paper are twofold. First,
the empirical evidence suggests that the entry regu-
lation in the German Trade and Crafts Code reduces
sustained entry into self-employment. Due to entry
regulation, the probability of being self-employed in
1998/99 with a venture started after reunification and
sustained for at least 5 years is lower in regulated
occupations in the East German transition context
after reunification than in the more stable West
German context. Accordingly, the entry regulation
suppresses long-living entrants who should have a
higher potential of positively impacting technological
progress, economic growth, and social welfare than
entrants in general or transient, short-lived entrants.
Second, this effect on the number of long-living
entrants is not accompanied by a counteracting effect
on the performance of long-living entrants, as mea-
sured by firm size in 1998/99. Altogether, these
empirical results provide support for the view that
entry regulation may hinder technological progress as
well as economic growth, and it may ultimately
reduce social welfare.
In the next section, I briefly introduce the firm
entry regulation and explain the empirical model for
investigating the regulatory effects on sustained entry
and entrants’ performance. Then, I summarize related
micro data evidence and introduce the research
questions addressed here. In Sect. 4, a brief descrip-
tion of the data and the main variables follows. The
empirical results are discussed in Sect. 5, and Sect. 6
provides conclusions.
2 Empirical framework and modeling
2.1 Firm entry regulation in the German Trade
and Crafts Code
In Germany, the Trade and Crafts Code (Gesetz zur
Ordnung des Handwerks, Fassung vom 28.12.1965)
imposes a mandatory standard, the master craftsman
certificate, on entrants into some, but not all, occupa-
tions. Entrepreneurs wanting to start a legally
independent business in one of the regulated occupa-
tions need a relevant master craftsman certificate.3
Regulated occupations are in fields as diverse as
metalworking, food, as well as clothing and textiles.
In addition, regulated and unregulated occupations can
be in similar fields: for example, confectionery,
hairdressing or printing and bookbinding are regulated,
but ice-cream production, beautician services or copy
and paper production are not. The master craftsman
certificate is an educational degree that an individual
can earn after several stages of training, collecting
work experience, and taking several examinations.
Typically, the individual first completes 2 or 3 years of
apprenticeship (Lehre and Lehrabschluss). Then he has
to work in the occupation for several years and has to
earn the related journeyman degree (Gesellenzeit and -
brief). The journeyman degree certifies a high level of
vocational training in all occupation-specific tasks and
is the prerequisite for admission to the master exam-
ination (Meisterpru¨fung). In the master examination, a
region-specific committee examines the master candi-
date. The committee consists of five members, three of
whom hold a master certificate in the candidates’
occupation, and many candidates do not pass the exam
(Deregulierungskommission 1991). Altogether, earn-
ing a master craftsman certificate involves not only
direct costs, such as fees for preparation courses, but
also a substantial time investment.
The German Trade and Crafts Code dates back to
the end of the 19th century, when parts of the historic
guild system became institutionalized as a first
backlash to the introduction of the freedom of trade
(Gewerbefreiheit) in the German Reich. The master
craftsman certificate was first imposed on individuals
who wanted to train apprentices in a regulated
occupation (Kleiner Befa¨higungsnachweis), but in
1935 it gained a substantially different role: all
individuals wanting to start a legally independent
business in one of the occupations covered by the
code needed a master craftsman certificate in a
relevant occupation (Großer Befa¨higungsnachweis).
Soon after World War II, the West German Trade
and Crafts Code confirmed the master craftsman
certificate as an entry requirement in the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) in West Germany, and it
is still relevant to many occupations today. The
3 See Prantl and Spitz-Oener (2009) for further details.
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planned economy system of the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) in East Germany enforced strict
entry regulation for all occupations and kept, in a
rather pro forma manner, an entry regulation that was
derived from the German Trade and Crafts Code
before World War II as well as the respective
educational degrees. Due to their common historical
origins, the set of occupations with code-based
regulation in East Germany was similar to that in
West Germany. As the reunification treaty recognized
all educational degrees earned in the GDR, East
Germans with a GDR master craftsman certificate
met the formal requirement relevant for running a
business in the respective regulated occupation
immediately after reunification. This is important
for the subsequent empirical analysis, as otherwise
entry regulation should exert even larger effects on
entry than reported below.
Proponents of the entry regulation in the German
Trade and Crafts Code name many benefits; among
these are higher average product quality in the
regulated markets and surplus vocational training
relevant to other sectors of the economy. Opponents,
including the German Monopolies Commission and
several other German or European Union institutions,
stress that individuals with a journeyman degree have
a similar occupational qualification to those with a
master craftsman certificate and they expect various
negative consequences of the entry regulation: higher
product prices, lower production quantities, less
entry, lower competition, slower job creation, and
less innovation (Deregulierungskommission 1991;
Monopolkommission 1998, 2002).
2.2 Empirical model
In this paper, the main interest is in average effects of
the entry regulation in the German Trade and Crafts
Code on entry into self-employment that is sustained
for several years and on the performance of long-
living entrants.
The most straightforward approach to estimating
a regulatory effect on such an outcome variable is to
compare the respective average outcomes in regu-
lated and unregulated occupations. The difference
between these averages would identify the average
effect on the chosen outcome variable if the
regulated occupations were randomly selected from
the population of occupations. The respective esti-
mation equation looks as follows:
Yio ¼ b0 þ b1Ro þ X
0
id þ uio: ð1Þ
In this equation, the dependent variable is the
outcome variable Y, a measure of sustained entry or
entrants’ performance. Entry regulation is indicated
by R. Subscript i indexes individuals, o refers to
occupations, and the error term is u. The vector X
includes individual characteristics, and the regression
coefficients are the parameters b0, b1, and d.
The main problem with this straightforward
approach is that systematic, unobserved factors may
influence both regulation and an outcome variable of
interest, despite the fact that most regulated occupa-
tions have been under the German Trade and Crafts
Code for many decades or even centuries. Differ-
ences between the average outcomes in regulated and
unregulated occupations may provide biased esti-
mates of the regulatory effects on sustained entry and
entrants performance.
To account for such unobserved factors, I exploit a
substantial natural experiment in entry regulation
accompanying German reunification (see also Prantl
and Spitz-Oener 2009). The natural experiment
provides data variation across regions and occupa-
tions that allows for taking two types of systematic,
unobserved effects into account when estimating the
regulatory effects of interest: (1) additive unobserved
effects on the outcome variable Y that differ across
the groups of regulated and unregulated occupations
while being constant across regions, and (2) additive
unobserved effects on Y that are common to all
occupations but differ across regions.4
The chosen empirical approach relies on two core
characteristics of German reunification. On the one
hand, the West German Trade and Crafts Code was
extended to East Germany shortly after reunification,
4 The empirical approach is similar to a standard difference-in-
difference approach due to the use of a natural experiment in
entry regulation and the consideration of two types of additive
unobserved effects (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Blundell and
MaCurdy 1999; Blundell and Costa Dias 2009). The average
effect of the regulatory change on treated individuals is
identified. This average treatment effect on the treated is
equivalent to the average effect on the whole population if
individuals’ responses to the regulatory change are homoge-
neous or if individuals with heterogeneous responses are
randomly assigned to treatment.
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in July 1990, and the entry regulation in the Code was
kept essentially unmodified.5 Since then, the same
regulatory rules have applied to the same set of
occupations in both German regions.
On the other hand, both regions differed funda-
mentally with respect to the economic context during
the 1990s. Most important are the following differ-
ences: West German market structures were rela-
tively stable after reunification, and opportunities for
firm entry opened up on a regular basis due to random
exit of incumbents, incremental technological change
or other reasons. Moreover, West Germans who held
the educational degrees necessary for firm entry in
regulated occupations after reunification had chosen
their education freely and had access to information
on the relevant entry regulation when taking that
decision. East Germany, instead, underwent an
unanticipated transition from a planned economy to
a market economy. After reunification, new entre-
preneurial activities, both firm entry as well as
industry restructuring, were suddenly predominant.
Most East Germans holding master craftsman certif-
icates after reunification had earned their degrees
under the GDR’s planned economy system. At that
time, training choices were restricted in various
respects and German reunification was unforeseeable,
including the entrepreneurial opportunities and the
regulation of firm entry after reunification.
To illustrate these differences, Tables 1 and 2
provide descriptive statistics calculated from the
survey data for the main estimation sample described
in greater detail in Sect. 4. In both German regions,
the shares of master craftsmen among employed
individuals in occupations with entry regulation are at
a similar level: the shares are 12% and 13% in East
and West Germany, respectively (see Table 1). When
aggregating all occupations, the respective shares are
7% and 6%. These results suggest that the master
craftsman certificate was assigned to a similar share
of the population in the GDR as individuals chose
and earned it in West Germany.6
Table 2, in contrast, documents substantial differ-
ences between potential entrepreneurs in East and
West Germany. In regulated occupations, I consider
all individuals with the master craftsman certificate of
the occupation they are working in as potential
entrepreneurs. They fulfill the entry standard that is
imposed on those who want to start a legally
independent business.7 In unregulated occupations,
all surveyed individuals are counted instead. In
Table 1 Master craftsman certificates in occupation groups and regions
Occupation group Master craftsman certificate East Germany (%) West Germany (%)
Occupations with entry regulation Yes 12.39 13.10
No 87.61 86.90
Occupations without entry regulation Yes 4.30 2.11
No 95.70 97.89
All occupations Yes 7.48 5.77
No 92.52 94.23
The table shows the shares of employed individuals with and without master craftsman certificate by occupation groups and regions.
The weighted descriptive statistics are for the main estimation sample of 15,575 employed individuals in the survey of 1998/99.
Individuals are 20–59 years old, work between 10 and 75 h per week, have German citizenship, and report all relevant information.
Excluded are individuals in the public sector, in nonprofit organizations or the mining and quarrying sector, and in occupations that
are not accredited by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the Bundesinstitut fu¨r Berufsbildung (BIBB).
5 See the Gesetz u¨ber die Inkraftsetzung des Gesetzes zur
Ordnung des Handwerks (Handwerksordnung) der Bundesre-
publik Deutschland in der Deutschen Demokratischen Repub-
lik (1990) and the Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik
u¨ber die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands, Anlage I,
Kapitel V, Sachgebiet B, Abschnitt III (1990). Note that not
only the West German Trade and Crafts Code, but also West
German product market regulation more generally, was quickly
extended to East Germany after reunification.
6 Note that the survey data at hand covers employed individ-
uals, but no other individuals in the East or West German labor
force and population.
7 Only about 3% of all other employed individuals in regulated
occupations report self-employment started after reunification
in East Germany and in West Germany. This is in line with the
imposed entry requirement.
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East Germany, 14% of all potential entrepreneurs in
unregulated occupations report being self-employed
in 1998/99 and having started their venture after
reunification. In regulated occupations the corre-
sponding share is 21%, implying a difference of 7
percentage points from the share in unregulated
occupations, and a ratio of 1.5. In West Germany,
17% of all potential entrepreneurs in regulated
occupations are self-employed in 1998/99 with a
venture that they started after reunification, and 6% in
unregulated occupations. All shares for West Ger-
many are lower than the corresponding ones for East
Germany—a result that is consistent with the expec-
tation of an exceptionally high level of new entre-
preneurial activities in a transition economy. The
difference in the propensity to start self-employment
after reunification among potential entrepreneurs in
regulated and unregulated occupations in West Ger-
many is 11 percentage points. The ratio is 2.8 and,
thus, about 90% higher than the corresponding ratio
of 1.5 in East Germany. Compared with unregulated
occupations, potential entrepreneurs in regulated
occupations in West Germany are more likely to be
self-employed in 1998/99 with a venture that they
started after reunification than in East Germany. This
pattern is in line with restricted training choices
during GDR times and with the fact that German
reunification was unforeseeable before 1989.
Given the discussed differences between East and
West Germany, my main conjecture is as follows:
Entry regulation based on the Trade and Crafts Code
is more binding in East than in West Germany.
Stronger effects on firm entry should arise in the
regulatory context of the East German transition
economy than in the more stable West German
context.
The regulatory effects estimated below are the
average effects of the West–East shift in the regu-
latory context on the probability of sustained entry
into self-employment after reunification and on the
size of long-living entrants in the regulated occupa-
tions. To estimate such an effect, I compare the
difference between the average outcomes of interest
in regulated and unregulated occupations in East
Germany against the corresponding difference in
West Germany after reunification. The estimation
equation is as follows:
Yior ¼ b0 þb1Ro þb2Er þb3RoEr þX
0
idþ uior: ð2Þ
In this equation, E indicates East Germany, b2 is the
related regression coefficient, and r indexes regions
(East and West Germany). All other variables and
parameters are defined as above. The following
equation provides a more flexible model specification
with occupation fixed effects:
Yior ¼ b0 þ co þ b2Er þ b3RoEr þ X
0
id þ uior: ð3Þ
The occupation effects, denoted by co, account for
unobserved occupation-specific determinants of the
Table 2 Entry into self-employment after reunification in regions and groups of individuals






master craftsman certificate (%)
Other
individuals (%)
East Germany Yes 14.44 21.32 3.30
No 85.56 78.68 96.70
West Germany Yes 6.30 17.38 2.74
No 93.70 82.62 97.26
The table shows the shares of employed individuals who report being self-employed in the survey of 1998/99 with a venture that they
started after reunification for unregulated occupations, for employed individuals with a relevant master craftsman certificate in
regulated occupations and for other employed individuals in regulated occupations by region. The table also shows the corresponding
shares of those who did not choose this type of self-employment. The weighted descriptive statistics are for the main estimation
sample of 15,575 employed individuals from the survey in 1998/99. Individuals are 20–59 years old, work between 10 and 75 h per
week, have German citizenship, and report all relevant information. Excluded are individuals in the public sector, in nonprofit
organizations or the mining and quarrying sector, and in occupations that are not accredited by the Federal Ministry of Education and
Research and the BIBB.
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outcome variable Y and, thus, for systematic variation
in the occupational composition of the group of
regulated occupations across regions, or of the group
of unregulated occupations. The set of occupation
effects represents a flexible replacement for b1 in
Eq. 2, the level effect of entry regulation averaging
across all the regulated occupations.
The focus in Eqs. 2 and 3 is on b3, the coefficient
of the interaction between entry regulation R and East
Germany E. From the exposition above, it follows
that b3 reflects the average effect of the West–East
shift in the regulatory context in the regulated
occupations on the considered outcome variable.
Equations 1 to 3 are estimated using ordinary least
squares, even with discrete dependent variables.
There are several reasons for doing so (Angrist and
Pischke 2009; Wooldridge 2002), but for each
considered discrete dependent variable I also com-
pare linear probability estimates against average
marginal effects computed from nonlinear probit
estimates (Ai and Norton 2003; Norton et al. 2004).
The main findings are robust to the choice of the
method.8 In all regressions, observations are
weighted to account for the sampling design and to
readjust to the structure of the population sampled
from (Wooldridge 2002). Standard errors allow for
correlation between individuals within the same
occupation.
3 Existing evidence and research questions
3.1 The effects on entry into self-employment:
existing microdata evidence
Microdata evidence on the relation between the entry
regulation in the German Trade and Crafts Code and
entry into self-employment after German reunifica-
tion has previously been provided by Prantl and
Spitz-Oener (2009). In their study, the effects on a
general measure of entry into self-employment are
investigated; the measure considers entry decisions
taken any time during the first decade after
reunification.9
The basic empirical analysis indicates that entry
regulation reduces this general entry measure more in
the regulatory context of the East German transition
economy than in the context of the more stable West
German economy. Implementing the empirical
approach as described above (see Sect. 2.2) gives
negative and significant estimates for the coefficient
of the interaction between entry regulation and East
Germany in equations explaining the probability of
being self-employed with a venture that was started at
some point during the first decade after reunification.
These estimates indicate that the probability is about
5.4–5.7 percentage points lower among employed
individuals in regulated occupations in East Germany
than in West Germany due to entry regulation.10
Prantl and Spitz-Oener (2009) then show that their
basic finding is closely linked to the entry costs
following from the mandatory standard for entrants in
regulated occupations. The regulatory effects on
entry into self-employment are stronger among
individuals who should be more restricted in their
entrepreneurial choices than others as a result of these
entry costs. These are individuals who changed their
occupation after their initial training and, thus, had
ceteris paribus less time to earn the relevant occupa-
tion-specific educational degrees than individuals
who stayed in the occupation they were initially
trained for. In addition, the basic finding is reported
to be robust when exploring the relevance of
additional factors that vary across occupations and
regions. These are, among others, occupation-specific
demand shocks in West Germany after reunification,
occupation-specific restructuring requirements in
East Germany, occupation- and region-specific
levels of incumbent self-employment started before
8 The respective estimation results are available upon request,
as are all other results discussed in the text but not reported in
the tables.
9 In another part of their study, Prantl and Spitz-Oener (2009)
investigate regulatory effects on occupational mobility among
workers after reunification: the entry regulation in the German
Trade and Crafts Code turns out to reduce occupational
mobility more in regulated occupations in East than in West
Germany. This result can be explained by entry regulation
hampering entry and competition more in regulated occupa-
tions in the East than in the West after reunification.
10 The estimates are for a sample of about 27,000 employed
individuals where the weighted average probability of being
self-employed with a venture started after 1989 is 4.7%.
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reunification, and skill structures that are heteroge-
neous across industries and regions.
In sum, the empirical results show that entry
regulation reduces a general measure of entry into
self-employment after reunification more in the
regulatory context of the East German transition
economy than in the context of the more stable West
German economy.
3.2 The effects on sustained entry and entrants’
performance: new questions
The existing evidence on the entry regulation in the
German Trade and Crafts Code for the decade after
German reunification and the related evidence on various
forms of entry regulation in other countries and time
periods (see Sect. 1) indicate that entry regulation
reduces entry of firms and entry into self-employment.
Such evidence is important, but not sufficient for
justifying policy reforms that reduce and simplify firm
entry regulation in order to foster technological progress,
economic growth, and social welfare. Instead, there are
many questions regarding the underlying mechanisms
that call for further empirical exploration.
Various recent policy-related sources may easily
generate the impression that less entry in response to
entry regulation unequivocally implies less techno-
logical progress, growth, and welfare, but economic
theory has long since clarified that this is not the
case.11 The theoretical literature also suggests that
entry regulation limiting entry is more likely to
hamper technological progress, growth or welfare if
the regulation under investigation inhibits specific
types of entrants. These are, for example, entrants
that directly increase product variety or charge low
prices and successfully attract demand, and entrants
or entry threats that are strong enough to trigger
advancing reactions in incumbents, including
increases in incumbent innovation or productivity
(Dixit and Stiglitz 1977; Spence 1976; Foster et al.
2008, 2009; Aghion et al. 2004, 2009; Weinschenk
2010). This provides the starting point for the
subsequent empirical analysis. Specifically, I address
the following research questions:
1. Does the entry regulation in the German Trade
and Crafts Code reduce the entry of firms that are
able to sustain their market activity for several
years?
2. Does this entry regulation influence the perfor-
mance of these long-living entrants, as measured
by firm size several years after entry?
Entrants that are long-living in the sense of
sustaining market activity during their initial years
after market entry constitute a selective subsample of
all entrants; most importantly, entrants with high
growth rates after entry are part of this group. This
follows from the large empirical literature on entry
and entrants’ performance reporting high rates of
initial growth for entrants conditional on survival and
low survival rates for entrants during their first years
after market entry (Audretsch 1995; Caves 1998;
Geroski 1995; Sutton 1997). Long-living entrants are
more likely than other entrants to be successful in
attracting demand and innovating, in creating new
jobs, and in exerting competitive pressure, displacing
incumbents or fostering innovation and productivity
improvements in incumbents.
Entrants that are transient in the sense of exiting
the market after only a few periods of economic
activity may exit as a consequence of weak entre-
preneurial abilities, low product qualities or unfavor-
able market conditions. They are less likely than
other entrants to have proven successful in attracting
demand or innovating, in creating new jobs or in
exerting competitive pressure. Instead, they are more
likely to cause welfare losses that a social planner or
regulator may try to reduce. For example, not much
can be learned from short-lived entrants’ market
experimentation in the case of entrants with similar
characteristics displacing one another repeatedly and
quickly. In addition, factor allocation to an entrant
can always damage other market participants sub-
stantially, in particular in case of bankruptcy.
Taken together, entrants sustaining market activity
during the initial years after market entry should have
a higher potential of positively impacting technolog-
ical progress, economic growth, and social welfare
11 Mankiw and Whinston (1986), among others, provide a
model of product markets where firms decide freely on entry
and must incur entry costs which cannot be recovered upon
exiting the market. In this model, equilibrium entry can be
excessively high from a welfare perspective (or socially
insufficient) instead of socially optimal. See also von We-
izsa¨cker (1980) for an earlier contribution showing that an
excessive number of homogeneous firms may produce in the




than do transient entrants. Accordingly, evidence of
reduced sustained entry in response to entry regula-
tion is a stronger indication of potentially negative
welfare effects than evidence of reduced entry in
general or of reduced transient entry.
Entry regulation may, however, not only influence
the probability of sustained entry into self-employment
and, thus, the number of long-living entrants, but also
their average performance. In that case, the composi-
tion of the group of long-living entrants is affected, and
this may influence the group’s contribution to techno-
logical progress, economic growth, and social welfare.
To shed light on this matter, I investigate the regulatory
effects of the entry regulation in the German Trade and
Crafts Code on the employment built up in firms that
entered after reunification and sustained their market
activity for at least 5 years.
4 Data
The subsequent empirical analysis is based on data
from a large survey that has been carried out
repeatedly since the 1970s by the German Federal
Institute for Vocational Training (Bundesinstitut fu¨r
Berufsbildung, BIBB) and the Research Institute of
the Federal Employment Service (Institut fu¨r Arbe-
itsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB): the ‘‘Qualifi-
cation and Career Survey’’. Approximately every 6–
7 years, these institutions collect survey data using
representative, unlinked cross-sections of about
30,000 employed individuals. For the purpose of this
paper, I use the survey wave launched in 1998/99. It
covers employed individuals in East and West
Germany, including self-employed entrepreneurs
who started self-employment after reunification and
did so up to 9 years before the survey was taken.
Information on the employment in the respective
firms at the time of the survey is also available.12
In the first part of the empirical analysis, I focus on
the impact of entry regulation on sustained entry into
self-employment after the fall of the Berlin Wall in
November 1989. In order to construct the dependent
variable I use data on the current employment status
of survey participants at the time of the survey in
1998/99 and, for self-employed individuals, data on
the year they started that entrepreneurial activity. The
dependent variable indicates individuals who were
self-employed in 1998/99 with a venture that they
started at least 5 years earlier, but after 1989 (1990–
1993). In the second part of the empirical analysis, I
investigate the impact of entry regulation on firm size
using a categorical measure of employment including
working entrepreneurs in 1998/99.13 This variable
distinguishes six size classes: (1) 1 employed indi-
vidual, (2) 2 employed individuals, (3) 3 or 4
employed individuals, (4) 5–9 employed individuals,
(5) 10–49 employed individuals, and (6) 50 or more
employed individuals. Alternatively, I use an indica-
tor that is coded 1 for self-employed entrepreneurs
who started between 1990 and 1993 with a venture
that has at least one additional employed individual
apart from themselves in 1998/99, and 0 otherwise.
The most important explanatory variables are
indicators for entry regulation, East Germany, and
the interaction of these variables (R, E, and R 9 E).
The indicator for entry regulation is coded 1 for
occupations with entry regulation, and 0 otherwise; it
is constructed using survey data on the occupation an
individual currently works in and information from
the German Trade and Crafts Code as enforced
during the 1990s. The indicator for East Germany is 1
in case of current residence in East Germany, and 0
otherwise. To capture influences of individual heter-
ogeneity on the dependent variables, I use demo-
graphic and educational variables. Table 3 provides
the definitions and some descriptive statistics for all
the variables used below.
The main estimation sample is for the first part of the
empirical analysis. It includes 15,575 individuals par-
ticipating in the survey of 1998/99 who are 20–59 years
old, work between 10 and 75 h per week, have German
citizenship, and report all the information of interest
here. Excluded are individuals in the public sector, in
nonprofit organizations or the mining and quarrying
sector, and in all occupations that are not accredited by
the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the
BIBB. In accredited occupations, vocational training is
based on federal law.14 These occupations are the
12 See Prantl and Spitz-Oener (2009) and references cited
therein for further details on the ‘‘Qualification and Career
Survey’’.
13 Continuous information on firm-size is not available in the
survey data that I use here.
14 The vocational training in accredited occupations is carried
out under the dual system of apprenticeship and, thus, consists
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population of interest in my study, since the German
Trade and Crafts Code regulates firm entry in some of
these, but not in others. In the second part of the
empirical analysis, where I focus on explaining firm
size, the estimation sample consists of those observa-
tions from the main sample that refer to individuals who
indicate being self-employed in 1998/99, having started
that activity at least 5 years earlier, but after 1989, and
owning a firm with fewer than 50 employed
individuals.15
5 Empirical results
In this section, I first discuss the impact of the entry
regulation in the German Trade and Crafts Code on
Table 3 Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics
Variable Definition Mean/share (std. dev.)
Self-employment started
between 1990 and 1993
Indicator equal to 1 for individuals who report being self-
employed in 1998/99 with a venture started between 1990
and 1993, else 0
0.0267
Self-employment started
between 1990 and 1999
Indicator equal to 1 for individuals who report being self-
employed in 1998/99 with a venture started between 1990
and 1999, else 0
0.0740
Employment in firms of self-
employed entrepreneurs who
started between 1990 and 1993
Employment in 1998/99 in six size classes (1, 2, 3–4, 5–9,
10–49, and 50 or more employees) as reported by self-




who started between 1990 and
1993 and employ at least one
more individual in 1998/99
Indicator equal to 1 for self-employed individuals who
started between 1990 and 1993 and employ at least one
additional individual apart from themselves in 1998/99,
else 0
0.5765
Entry regulation Indicator equal to 1 for occupations with the entry regulation
of the German Trade and Crafts Code, else 0
0.3215
East Germany Indicator equal to 1 for residency in East Germany, else 0 0.2044
Gender Indicator equal to 1 for males, 0 for females 0.5728
Age Age of the individual in years in 1998/99 38.78 (10.00)
Low education Indicator equal to 1 for individuals with no vocational
training degree, else 0
0.1067
Medium education Indicator equal to 1 for individuals with a vocational training
degree (dual system of apprenticeship, vocational school),
else 0
0.8288
High education Indicator equal to 1 for individuals with a degree from a
university or a technical college, else 0
0.0645
Migrant Indicator equal to 1 for individuals who are living in East or
West Germany and have German citizenship but grew up
either in a foreign country or the other part of Germany
than they currently live in, else 0
0.0811
The table provides nonweighted descriptive statistics for the main estimation sample of 15,575 employed individuals from the survey
of 1998/99. Individuals are 20–59 years old, work between 10 and 75 h per week, have German citizenship, and report all relevant
information. Excluded are individuals in the public sector, in nonprofit organizations or the mining and quarrying sector, and in
occupations that are not accredited by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the BIBB.
Footnote 14 continued
of both on-the-job training in companies and training in
schools. See Harhoff and Kane (1997) and references cited
therein for more details. The empirical results reported in
Sect. 4 are robust if re-estimated on a sample with all occu-
pations, including those that are not accredited by the Federal
Ministry of Education and Research and the BIBB.
15 Due to the latter restriction, I exclude two observations with
missing firm size and seven observations with firm size of more
than 50 employed individuals. The regulatory effect estimates




the probability of sustained entry into self-employ-
ment after reunification and then the effect on the
performance of long-living entrants.
About 38% of all self-employed individuals who
started a venture after reunification (in the years
1990–1993) and were surveyed in 1998/99 have then
been active with it for at least 5 years. Table 4 shows
estimates of linear probability models that explain the
probability of this type of sustained entry into self-
employment for employed individuals.
Table 4 Sustained entry after reunification
1 2 3 4
Sample coverage
East Germany West Germany East and West Germany East and West Germany
Explanatory variables Dependent variable












































































Occupation effects No No No Yes
Number of observations 3,183 12,392 15,575 15,575
The table provides ordinary least-squares estimates of a linear probability model explaining the probability of long-lasting self-
employment started after reunification. The dependent variable is coded 1 for individuals who are self-employed at the time of the
survey in 1998/99 and started their venture between 1990 and 1993. Estimates in columns 3 and 4 are for the sample of 15,575
employed individuals from the survey of 1998/99 who are 20–59 years old, work from 10–75 h per week, have German citizenship,
and report all relevant information. Excluded are individuals in the public sector, in nonprofit organizations or the mining and
quarrying sector, and in occupations that are not accredited by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the BIBB. In
column 1, the estimates are based on the subsample of 3,183 individuals who report current residence in East Germany. In column 2,
the corresponding subsample of 12,392 West Germans is used.
a Robust standard errors allowing for correlation between individuals within the same occupation are reported in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
The impact of firm entry regulation on long-living entrants 71
123
Column 1 provides the estimate of Eq. 1 with the
entry regulation indicator R as main explanatory
variable for the subsample of 3,183 employed
individuals residing in East Germany. The other
explanatory variables are a constant and measures of
individual characteristics (age, gender, education).
Column 2 provides the corresponding estimate for
the subsample of 12,392 employed individuals resid-
ing in West Germany. In both these regressions, I find
negative coefficients of the entry regulation indicator
R. The one for East Germany (column 1) is statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level, in contrast to the one
for West Germany (column 2). As discussed in
Sect. 2.2, these results may indicate effects of the
entry regulation, but they may also reflect systematic,
unobserved effects on the probability of being self-
employed with a long-lasting venture started after
reunification.
The refined model specification in Eq. 2 allows for
estimating the average effects of the West–East shift
in the regulatory context after reunification while
controlling for the following types of additive
unobserved effects: those that differ systematically
across the groups of regulated and unregulated
occupations but are constant across regions, and
those that are common to all occupations but differ
systematically across regions. Equation 2 includes
the indicator of East Germany E and the interaction
term between entry regulation and East Germany,
besides the indicator of entry regulation R and all
other explanatory variables of Eq. 1.
The relevant sample for estimating Eq. 2 covers
all 15,575 employed individuals in East and West
Germany, and the estimates are shown in column 3 of
Table 4. The estimated coefficient of the level term
for entry regulation is negative and insignificant, but
the coefficient of the interaction term between East
Germany and entry regulation is negative and signif-
icant. The latter result suggests that entry regulation
lowers the probability of self-employment in long-
lasting ventures started after reunification by 5.4
percentage points more in regulated occupations in
the East than in the West. The coefficient of the level
term for East Germany is positive and significant,
which is well in line with economic transition
triggering unusually high entry and industry
restructuring.
As shown in column 4, estimating a flexible model
specification with occupation fixed effects (Eq. 3)
confirms the negative coefficient of the interaction
between East Germany and entry regulation. Accord-
ingly, the main finding holds up if unobserved
occupation-specific heterogeneity and, thus, system-
atic variation in the occupational composition of the
groups of regulated and unregulated occupations
across regions are allowed for.16
All model specifications in Table 4 include further
explanatory variables, measuring demographic and
educational characteristics, to capture the effects of
individual heterogeneity on sustained entry into self-
employment. Men are more likely than women to be
self-employed in 1998/99 with a long-lasting venture
started after reunification. For age, the estimated
effects are positive along the whole sample distribu-
tion and increasing until an age of 32–38 years in the
regressions in columns 2–4; in the regression in
column 1, the maximum is attained at 49 years. The
estimated effects for the included education indica-
tors are weak.17 Migrants with German citizenship
who live in East or West Germany but grew up in a
foreign country or the part of Germany they do not
live in at the time of the survey are less likely to be
self-employed with a long-lasting venture started
after reunification than nonmigrants.18
16 For comparison, I re-estimate Eq. 3 with all exogenous
variables as in column 4 of Table 4, but a dependent variable
as in Prantl and Spitz-Oener (2009). This dependent variable
indicates self-employed individuals with a venture started any
time after reunification (in the years 1990–1999). The estima-
tion results suggest that entry regulation reduces the probability
of these self-employment activities by 7.3 percentage points
more in regulated occupations in the East than in the West. In
line with expectations, this effect on a general entry measure is
higher than the sustained entry effect of 5.4 in column 4 of
Table 4 (by about 1.9 percentage points).
17 In some model specifications, highly educated individuals
residing in West Germany and holding a degree from a
university or a technical college have a higher probability of
being self-employed in 1998/99 with a long-lasting venture
started after reunification than individuals with medium
education. Medium education indicates a vocational training
degree from the dual system of apprenticeship or a vocational
school. I find significant coefficient estimates neither for highly
educated individuals who reside in East Germany nor for
individuals with low education, i.e., those holding neither a
vocational training degree nor a higher educational degree.
18 In contrast, the regression mentioned in footnote 16 shows
that migrants do not differ significantly from nonmigrants in an
empirical model explaining a general measure of entry. In
addition, note that the regulatory effect estimates in Table 4
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Altogether, the pattern of empirical findings in
Table 4 indicates that entry regulation decreases the
probability of sustained entry into self-employment
in regulated occupations more during economic
Table 5 Size of long-living entrants started after reunification












Explanatory variables Dependent variable


























































































Occupation effects No No No Yes Yes
Number of observations 166 241 407 407 407
In columns 1–4, the table provides ordinary least-squares estimates of linear models explaining the employment in long-living
entrants. The dependent variable indicates the number of all employees (incl. working entrepreneurs) in 1998/99 in ventures started
between 1990 and 1993. The variable is categorical with six size classes: (1) 1 employed individual, (2) 2 employed individuals, (3) 3
or 4 employed individuals, (4) 5–9 employed individuals, (5) 10–49 employed individuals, and (6) 50 or more employed individuals.
In column 5, the table provides ordinary least-squares estimates of a linear probability model where the dependent variable is equal to
1 for self-employed entrepreneurs who started between 1990 and 1993 and employ at least one more individual apart from themselves
in 1998/99, and 0 otherwise. Estimates in columns 3–5 are for the sample of 407 self-employed individuals from the survey of 1998/
99 who started between 1990 and 1993, are 20–59 years old, work from 10 to 75 h per week, have German citizenship, and report all
relevant information. Excluded are individuals in the public sector, in nonprofit organizations or the mining and quarrying sector, and
in occupations that are not accredited by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the BIBB. In column 1, the estimates
are based on the subsample of 166 self-employed individuals who report current residence in East Germany. In column 2, the
corresponding subsample of 241 West Germans is used.
a Robust standard errors allowing for correlation between individuals within the same occupation are reported in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
Footnote 18 continued
remain robust if all 1,263 migrants are excluded from the
estimation samples.
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transition than in a more stable market environment.
This suggests that transient, short-lived entrants are
not the only driving force behind regulatory effects
on general measures of entry into self-employment,
as, for example discussed in footnote 16 and in Prantl
and Spitz-Oener (2009). The entry regulation in the
German Trade and Crafts Code does not only
suppress transient, short-lived entrants that may well
cause welfare losses, but also long-living entrants that
should have a higher potential of positively impacting
technological progress, economic growth, and social
welfare.
Having shown that the entry regulation in the
German Trade and Crafts Code reduces the proba-
bility of sustained entry into self-employment after
reunification, I now turn to the effect on entrants’
performance. This is important, as the sustained
entry effect lowering the number of long-living
entrants is not necessarily the only regulatory effect
influencing how the group of long-living entrants
contributes to technological progress, economic
growth, and social welfare. The effect on the
individual performance of the group members can
also be relevant. Specifically, I investigate the effect
on the long-term average employment built up and
reported in the survey of 1998/99 by self-employed
individuals who started their ventures after reunifi-
cation and sustained market activity for at least
5 years. The respective dependent variable is a
categorical measure of firm size that distinguishes
six employment classes (see Sect. 4).
Column 1 of Table 5 displays the estimates of
Eq. 1 for the subsample of 166 self-employed
individuals with long-lasting ventures started after
reunification in East Germany. Column 2 provides
the corresponding estimates for the West German
subsample of 241 observations. I find positive
coefficients for the indicator of entry regulation R
in these regressions. The one for East Germany
(column 1) is insignificant; the one for West Ger-
many is significant at the 5% level (column 2). The
results for Eq. 2 in column 3 indicate a positive and
significant coefficient of the level term for entry
regulation and a negative, insignificant coefficient of
the interaction term between entry regulation and
East Germany. Accordingly, there is no empirical
support for differential effects of the entry regulation
in the German Trade and Crafts Code on the long-
term average employment in long-living entrants
started after reunification in regulated occupations in
East and West Germany.19
The main finding of an insignificant coefficient for
the interaction term between East Germany and entry
regulation is robust to the following changes of the
model specification. First, the coefficient estimate
is also insignificant if one uses a flexible model
specification with occupation fixed effects as in Eq. 3
(column 4). Second, the result is also confirmed when
using a discrete dependent size indicator (coded 1 for
self-employed entrepreneurs who employ at least one
more individual apart from themselves, and 0
otherwise) instead of the categorical variable of firm
size (column 5).
As the chosen measure of entrants’ performance
may depend on individual heterogeneity, all model
specifications in Table 5 also include measures of
demographic and educational characteristics. The
coefficient estimates for males are positive, but
mostly insignificant. For age, I find a concave
relationship with firm size; the coefficient estimates
for the age terms are jointly significant in col-
umns 1–4, at least at the 10% level. Education
indicators are always insignificant. Migrants employ
fewer workers in 1998/99 than nonmigrants; the
coefficient estimates in columns 3 and 4 are signif-
icant at the 10% level.
In summary, I find no differential effect of the
entry regulation in the German Trade and Crafts
Code on the long-term average employment of long-
living entrants in regulated occupations in East and
West Germany. Accordingly, the estimation results in
Table 5 provide no indication of an effect on
entrants’ performance that would counteract the
negative effect on the probability of sustained entry
into self-employment after reunification and, thus, the
number of long-living entrants.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, I provide empirical evidence on the
consequences of entry regulation for sustained entry
into self-employment, as opposed to entry in general.
19 The coefficient estimate for the level term of East Germany
varies across model specifications. It is close to zero and
insignificant in column 3, positive and insignificant in col-
umn 4, and significantly positive in column 5.
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In addition, I study the effects on the performance of
long-living entrants that are able to sustain market
activity for several years after entry. The entry
regulation under scrutiny here is a substantial
restriction to entry following from the German Trade
and Crafts Code. The law imposes a mandatory
standard, the master craftsman certificate, on entre-
preneurs who want to start a legally independent firm
in one of the regulated occupations. In order to
identify the effects of interest, I exploit the situation
after German reunification when East and West
Germany faced different economic conditions, but
fell under the same law regulating entry in some
occupations, though not in others. In the East German
transition economy, entry regulation should exert
stronger effects on entry than in the more stable West
German market economy. Building on this conjec-
ture, I estimate average effects of the West–East shift
in the regulatory context by comparing the difference
between the average outcomes in regulated occupa-
tions and unregulated occupations in East Germany
after reunification against the corresponding differ-
ence in West Germany.
The main empirical findings reported in this paper
are as follows. First, the entry regulation in the
German Trade and Crafts Code reduces sustained
entry into self-employment more in regulated occu-
pations in the East German transition context after
reunification than in the more stable West German
context. Accordingly, the entry regulation suppresses
long-living entrants who should have a higher
potential of positively impacting technological pro-
gress, economic growth, and social welfare than
entrants in general or transient, short-lived entrants.
Second, this effect on the number of long-living
entrants is not accompanied by a counteracting effect
on the performance of long-living entrants, as mea-
sured by firm size several years after entry. Alto-
gether, these empirical results support the claim that
entry regulation may hinder technological progress as
well as economic growth, and it may ultimately
reduce social welfare.
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